Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
CONF-IRM 2012 Proceedings

International Conference on Information Resources
Management (CONF-IRM)

5-2012

Information Accountability with Policy Languages
for e-Health
Randike Gajanayake
Queensland University of Technology, g.gajanayake@qut.edu.au

Renato Iannella
National E-Health Transition Authority, renato.iannella@nehta.gov.au

Tony Sahama
Queensland University of Technology, t.sahama@qut.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2012
Recommended Citation
Gajanayake, Randike; Iannella, Renato; and Sahama, Tony, "Information Accountability with Policy Languages for e-Health" (2012).
CONF-IRM 2012 Proceedings. 74.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2012/74

This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Resources Management (CONF-IRM) at AIS Electronic Library
(AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in CONF-IRM 2012 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For
more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Information Accountability with Policy Languages for eHealth
Randike Gajanayake
Queensland University of Technology
g.gajanayake@qut.edu.au
Renato Iannella
National E-Health Transition Authority
renato.iannella@nehta.gov.au
Tony Sahama
Queensland University of Technology
t.sahama@qut.edu.au

Abstract
ICT is becoming a prominent part of healthcare delivery but brings with it information privacy
concerns for patients and competing concerns by caregivers. A proper balance between these
must be established in order to fully utilise ICT capabilities in healthcare. Information
accountability is a fairly new concept to computer science which focuses on fair use of
information. In this paper we investigate the different issues that need to be addressed when
applying information accountability principles to manage healthcare information. We briefly
introduce an information accountability framework for handling electronic health records
(eHR). We focus more on digital rights management by considering data in eHRs as digital
assets and how we can represent privacy policies and data usage policies as these are key
factors in accountability systems.
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1. Introduction
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is becoming a prominent part of
healthcare delivery. But issues such as information security and privacy concerns have
hindered its progression towards improving healthcare delivery. The use of ICT in healthcare
has given rise to a comparatively new informatics domain called e-health. Electronic health
records (eHR) are the driving force behind e-health. An eHR is a complete record of a
patient’s medical history which may include information pertaining to sensitive concerns such
as sexual health, mental health, addictions to drug or alcohol, abortions etc. Due to this reason
patients demand strong security for their eHRs. Without trusting that their sensitive health
information will be safeguarded, patients are reticent to fully and honestly disclose their
personal information and may avoid seeking care altogether (Goldman and Hudson 2000).

Unlawful disclosure of personal information could cause the subject of the information
embarrassment and may affect insurability, child custody cases, and even employment (Pratt,
Unruh et al. 2006; Cannoy and Salam 2010). Therefore, informational privacy is vital to
ensure the reliability of eHR systems. Alan Westin, in his book “Privacy and Freedom”,
defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin
1967), i.e. control of private information. Others argue that data confidentiality addresses
privacy requirements. Confidentiality means giving the information owner the control of the
information whereas privacy deals with giving the subject of the information control over it.
Data ownership is itself subject to disparity in different contexts. However, a significant
degree of control over personal information is essential to protecting information privacy
(Solove 2008).
Access to sensitive information must be handled with rigor and vigilance. Various methods
have been proposed to address the privacy conundrum ranging from strict access control to
privacy-preserving algorithms such as anonymization (Bayardo and Agrawal 2005),
generalization (Sweeney 2002), and perturbation (Kargupta, Datta et al. 2003). However, these
techniques may discourage honest and legitimate users from accessing data required to fulfill
genuine tasks. Access control mechanisms either permit or deny access, there are no
intermediate states. They are not policy-aware and may also hinder the actions of legitimate
users of an information system (Kagal and Pato 2010). According to Kagal et al. (2010)
access control mechanisms alone are inadequate for privacy protection.
Information accountability (IA) complements access control mechanisms and supports policyawareness. In theory, the principles behind IA would make sure that the information users
follow the appropriate rules and policies. To facilitate IA principles, systems should
implement usage policies on its assets. Data in eHRs can be considered as digital assets. Data
management in e-health thus entails digital rights management (DRM). Privacy policies in ehealth can be represented using an appropriate digital rights expression language (REL).
Policies on the use of data in an eHR can be set by the patient, a trusted healthcare
representative, a health authority or all the above.
The contribution of this paper is an information accountability framework (IAF) for eHR
systems and the structure of the policy representation in the framework. The IAF is built on IA
principles which we will discuss in section 3. We will illustrate data usage policy
representations for eHRs using the open digital rights language (ODRL) with the aid of a
simple case scenario.

2. Information Accountability
A serious concern for accountability systems is the lack of formal foundations. Formalising
information accountability has been widely explored by many in recent work (Lampson 2005;
Weitzner, Abelson et al. 2008; Jagadeesan, Jeffrey et al. 2009; Sloan and Warner 2010;
Feigenbaum, Hendler et al. 2011; Feigenbaum, Jaggard et al. 2011). Feigenbaum et al. (2011)
claim that a purely preventive approach to security is inadequate, thus supporting the claim by
Kagal et al. (2010). They investigate some existing frameworks for accountability and explore
whether deterrence is a better term than accountability and puts forth a formal model for
accountability in terms of punishment (Feigenbaum, Jaggard et al. 2011). Assuming that the

relevant privacy policies exist, Jagadeesan et al. (2009) make an effort to develop formal
foundations for information accountability in terms of the privacy policies which define
appropriate sharing of information among agents and provides algorithms that can be used by
an auditor to check for compliance with rules.
A solution to the question of compliance of privacy policies is proposed by Weitzner et al.
(2008) by tracking all transactions and making them transparent. They assume that appropriate
policy rules exist with a formal representation, policy-aware transaction logs and a policyreasoning capability which would enable accountability systems to hold information users
(individuals and organisations) accountable for their actions. With a strong focus on the facts
Weitzner et al. (2008) put forth, Sloan et al. (2010) address information accountability in
broader scope by considering social policies and technical aspects. They point out that
automated checking for compliance of privacy policy is a necessity for accountability systems
and without the adequate foundations in both formal models and public policy issues they are
unlikely to do so. They believe that policies required to developing accountability systems are
informational norms and state that a proper balance between privacy requirements and
competing concerns is necessary to sustain the architectural and social aspects introduced by
Weitzner et al. (2008).
Defining a general formula for IA with the current ambiguous nature of the concept is a
difficult feat and would not directly benefit the development of accountability systems which
is the ultimate goal. We believe that contextual definitions would be more suitable in that the
characteristics of the policies, if not the proper policies themselves, can be developed.

2.1. Principles of Information Accountability
In computer science, access control and accountability are closely related. Access control is
about restrictions, whereas accountability is about punishment. Therefore, audit logs are an
essential part of an accountability system (Lampson 2009). In any information system all trust
is within the system, outsiders cannot be held accountable. We cannot hold everyone
accountable, it is crucial that we identify who can be held accountable and who cannot.
Therefore, an accountability system should have strong system boundaries. Accountability
systems facilitate fair use of information. Rather than prevention via rigid locks on data,
accountability is about deterrence. The presence of an accountability mechanism deliver a
threat of punishment which would deter users from intentional misuse. Accountability systems
should facilitate transparency such that all relevant parties have the capability to observe how
information is used and by whom. This makes bad acts visible and helps deter users from
misuse.
The users of an accountability system should be well informed, i.e. a notification process
where users are informed about underlying policies before an action occurs must be put in
place. For example a user will be notified whether he is authorised to access/use a particular
set of data he is trying to access/use and the ramifications if he proceeds regardless of the
warning. This will also help in facilitating non-repudiation which is a significant aspect in
information security. All users of the system are kept informed of relevant transactions by the
Message Engine and related services in the IAF below.
When holding someone accountable, trustworthiness of the data about the inappropriate
transaction(s) is important. Hence, provenance of data and metadata is a significant factor in
information accountability. As Moreau et al (2008) point out, electronic data does not have the

necessary historical information that would help end-users, reviewers or regulators make the
necessary verifications. In an accountability system provenance can be facilitated using
appropriate transaction logs (Policy aware Transaction Logs and Transaction Metadata
Engine in Figure 1). These transaction logs also serve another purpose in terms of
accountability by being policy-aware. Policy-aware transaction logs can also facilitate policy
reasoning capabilities (facilitated by the Policy Reasoning Engine in Figure 1) and enable the
users to reason about misuse and against claims of misuse.
Creating proper incentives that would make consumers follow rules of accountability systems
is important (Sloan and Warner 2010). For an information user, the threat of punishment for
misuse is an incentive to follow system rules. An incentive such as a strong assurance of
privacy should be given to patients to prevent them from withholding information or enforcing
rigid restrictions on data which would be their obvious cause of action to secure their
information.

2.2. Information Accountability in Healthcare
In order to understand the concept of information accountability in healthcare, it is important
to clearly identify the different parties in healthcare that can be held accountable, the issues for
which a party can be held accountable and the appropriate mechanisms for accountability in
healthcare (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). The National E-Health Transition Authority (2011)
has identified several types of roles with different capabilities in their new Personally
Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system; individuals, nominated representatives,
authorised representatives, providers and nominated providers. Policies should be developed
that address the different capabilities of roles within the industry. These policies should
capture the requirements of all relevant parties. In a healthcare domain it is difficult to define
who owns health information. It is clear that patients are the subjects of health information.
But patients are not always medical professionals; hence it is impossible to give them full
control of their health information. Privacy policies should accompany an input from a
professional health body such as a trusted medical practitioner or a central health authority.
But it is important to balance between the patient’s privacy requirements and the requirements
of the healthcare providers or the care givers (competing concerns).
In a healthcare setting, the patient’s privacy policies cannot contradict those set by the
healthcare providers or the health authority. The IMIA code of ethics for medical information
professionals (International Medical Informatics Association 2002) states under their first
ethics principle that “All persons have a fundamental right to privacy, and hence to control
over the collection, storage, access, use, communication, manipulation and disposition of data
about themselves”. Taking this to consideration let us devise the following general
requirements of a patient with an eHR: 1) the capability to control access to the eHR by
allowing only a preferred set of medical practitioners access to the eHR, 2) the capability to
hide certain health information from health practitioners who already have access to their eHR,
3) the capability to check how the eHR is manipulated by authorised users, 4) the capability to
inquire about concerning usage. Let us also consider a the following requirements of
healthcare practitioners: 1) the capability to define their security policies within the
organization, 2) access to the relevant information in a non-restrictive and timely manner, 3)
the capability to share patient health information with other health specialists, 4) the capability
to override patients’ security settings in special circumstances (e.g. life threatening emergency

situations, mental health related situations). We take these requirements in to consideration
when designing our IAF for eHR systems. It is important to note that usage policy
enforcement might not always be beneficial to the patient. While fulfilling these privacy
requirements under no circumstance must the health of the patient is compromised. A
compromise between the requirements must entail the final policy representation of the
systems and the proper integration of these policies would improve patient confidence in the
system. Clear procedures for overriding usage policies in emergency situations should be
defined. The nature of the healthcare domain forces the implementation of a break the glass
approach in emergency situations.
Apart from the requirements stated above, certain circumstances might require some health
conditions be kept hidden from the patients. For example this may be the case for patients
suffering from severe mental health conditions where the knowledge of particular illnesses
may aggravate existing health conditions. They may also be considered unfit to manage their
eHRs. We acknowledge this eventuality but consider them as rare occurrences and do not
integrate such capabilities in to the framework. However, in such cases the control over the
patient’s eHR may be given to a custodian or a trusted health professional (HP) such as the
patients GP who can take the patient’s role in controlling the eHR.

3. Information Accountability Framework for EHR Systems
Considering the information accountability principles and the contextual requirements of
healthcare discussed above, we designed the information accountability framework (IAF) for
e-health systems depicted in Figure 1. Due to space restrictions we shall only give a brief
overview of the IAF in this paper.
The core components of the IAF are the privacy-aware policy engine, the policy-aware
transaction logs and the policy reasoning engine within the policy engine. The IAF has inputs
from the patients, the health authority and health professionals who wish to access/use
information. The policy aggregator engine will amalgamate the patient’s policies and the
health authority’s policies. This amalgamation is done in such a way that the patient’s privacy
requirements are met and the health authorities’ policies be satisfied. HPs are required to lodge
a usage request before they are able to access the eHR data. If their requests are satisfactory
they are provided with the requested data. Necessary notifications are sent to patients about the
activities on their eHR data. The patients are able to lodge usage inquiry queries on certain
episodes of information usage. The health professionals can answer those queries by lodging
reasoning queries as to why they have done so. All queries made by the actors are policy
aware. Hence the need for policy-aware transaction logs.

Figure 1: Information Accountability Framework for eHRs
We note here that NEHTA’s PCEHR (National E-Health Transition Authority 2011) system
describe an audit mechanism to improve consumer confidence in disclosing information in the
system. It provides the consumers the capability to investigate the use of information by care
providers. Their real time audit system differs from what we propose in that it is not explicitly
policy or privacy aware. The policy and privacy aware audit mechanism in our IAF will enable
the consumers to be more independent and would help towards giving the patients more
control of their health information.

3.1. Digital Rights Management
The advancement of ICT, especially the role of the Internet, has led to the need of proper
protection of digital media such as music-files, video-files, etc. Digital contracts were
developed to control the flow and use of information. These contracts were expressed using
digital property rights languages. Such technologies are known as digital rights management
(DRM). DRM technologies are well known for their role in copyright protection of media files
on the Internet and are becoming a prominent resource in protecting private information of
individuals (Feigenbaum, Freedman et al. 2002). DRM has many similarities to the traditional
access control model but differs in that they require information to remain protected even after
access is granted. DRM deals with usage control of information resources by authorised users.
Each piece of information is protected by a usage license created by the digital rights holder.
DRM can benefit e-health technologies by providing a means to manage the use and control of
patient electronic health records. The patients and the health authority have the rights to
manage the usage licenses which can be expressed in Rights Expression Languages (REL).
RELs are a critical aspect of DRM systems. RELs such as XrML (ContentGuard 2011) and the
Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL Initiative 2012) are prominent among others.
The ODRL rights expression language provides a syntax and semantics to express policies
related to digital assets. The ODRL core model is formally specified using UML notation and
aims to be independent from implementation constraints and is able to express a wide range of
policy-based information (ODRL Initiative 2012). In the next sections we will show how
patient privacy policies and other eHR requirements can be represented in ODRL expressions.

3.2. Healthcare Scenario
Consider the following scenario. Gary has a comprehensive eHR. This eHR is formulated such
that each type of data (e.g. identity data, general health data, dental health data, mental health
data, etc.) can be distinguished by eHR data type identifiers. For each of these data types there
exists a set of predefined purposes for which those data can be used. The purposes are defined
by a central health authority considering all necessary requirements to address every episode
of care. Gary has a list of trusted healthcare providers (health professionals) to whom he may
give access to data in his eHR. Peter is Gary’s GP, Sandra is a dermatologist, Bill is a sexual
health specialist and Matt is a mental health specialist who has treated Gary in the recent past.
Gary can set privacy settings to govern the access to his eHR. A central health authority can
also set access settings to patient’s eHR by considering the roles of each health professional.

3.2.1. Scenario
After noticing a skin rash, Gary visits his trusted dermatologist Sandra for a check up. After a
preliminary examination, Sandra thinks that Gary’s skin condition could be linked to a known
sexually transmitted disease (STD). Gary does not have a sexual health specialist in his list of
trusted health professionals. However, Sandra wants to share Gary’s details with a sexual
health specialist, Bill, in order to get a specialists opinion on the situation. Bill has a default
access level set by the health authority to be able to access patients’ sexual health details and
dermatology details. Since Sandra is in Gary’s list of trusted HPs to be able to access Gary’s
dermatology information, she can initiate a request to share Gary’s details with other health
professionals. Gary, however, is notified of this action by Sandra. After Bill gets this request,
he initiates a usage request to use the data for diagnosis purposes. Gary has a history of mental

illness and does not want anyone else other than his GP (Peter) and a trusted mental health
specialist who treated him (Matt) to know about it. At some point during or after this episode
of care, Gary may include Bill to his list of trusted health professional.

3.2.2. Scenario with ODRL

Figure 2: Settings for Sandra by Gary

The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 2 is as follows.
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy"
uid="policy-use-ehr" conflict="o:prohibit">
<o:permission>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/>
<o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:read"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:healthCare"/>
</o:permission>
<o:prohibition>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/>
<o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:read"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:mentalHealthCare"/>
</o:prohibition>
</o:policy>

In the privacy policy above, Gary gives Sandra permission to access his entire health record
and prohibits her from accessing his sexual health and mental health details. The conflict
attribute of the policy is set to “prohibit” indicating that prohibitions take precedence in the

policy. Gary’s settings for other trusted HPs have the same structure while attribute values
change accordingly.

Figure 3: Settings for Sandra by the health authority

The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 3 is as follows.
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type="
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/agreement" uid="policy-use-ehr">
<o:permission>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/>
<o:party uid="urn:health:authority" role="o:assigner"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:read"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare">
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare">
</o:permission>
</o:policy>

The health authority is responsible for setting default access policies for specific healthcare
roles, in this case for the role of a dermatologist. In the policy in Figure 3 the health authority
gives Sandra the permission to access Gary’s dermatology details and sexual health details.
Note here that Gary’s settings prohibit Sandra from accessing his sexual health details. But we
assume a hypothetical scenario where a relationship between skin conditions and STDs exist,
and every dermatologist should have access to the patient’s sexual health details. The health
authority is aware of this fact and allows all dermatologists access to patients sexual health
details. The settings by the health authority always prevail over patient settings. The patient
however will be given notice of this before any actions occur on the data. Similar relationships

may be present in the medical field. Therefore, an input from an entity with the relevant
medical knowledge is essential in the formulation of policies of this nature. The final policy
will be a combination of the two policies and hence the requirement for a policy aggregation
engine in our IAF. The patient is given due notice of this before any actions occur on the data.
Any usage requests by Sandra are compared with this aggregated policy and if compatible, the
requested usage licenses are issued. In the case of an incompatible usage request, the user is
given notice as to why the license is not issued and the user can choose to comply with the
existing policy or to override it. In such a situation the patient is notified about possible misuse
of information.

Figure 4: Request to share Gary’s data with Bill

The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 4 is as follows.
<o:policy xmlns:o="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type="http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request"
uid="policy-share-ehr">
<o:permission>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:share"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare">
<o:constraint name="o:recipient" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:bill">
</o:permission>
</o:policy>

The policy in Figure 4 represents Sandra’s request to the eHR system to share Gary’s
dermatology details with Bill. If Sandra is granted with the license for this policy she can

initiate the sharing process. After the initiation, Bill will have access to the eHR Data stated in
the policy but still has to request a usage license from the eHR system. This is given in Figure
5. In this policy Bill requests a license to read Gary’s dermatology details for the purpose of a
dermatology related episode of care (dermatHealthCare).

Figure 5: Usage request by Bill

The ODRL XML Encoding for the UML in Figure 5 is as follows.
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request"
uid="policy-use-ehr">
<o:permission>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthPro:sexualHealth:bill" role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:read"/>
<o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare">
</o:permission>
</o:policy>

Usage requests by users are compared with the predefined policies and if satisfied, the licenses
are issued. In this case however, Bill’s usage request will be compared with the sharing
request initiated by Sandra since Bill is not currently in the trusted list of health professionals.
Using this policy representation we can clearly define patient privacy concerns and the
requirements of the healthcare domain in terms of information access. Individual HPs can also
implement their access requirements with the consent of the patients. With this representation

we fulfill the first requirement for accountability systems. Policy-aware transaction logs,
policy reasoning and the other components of the IAF can be developed over the existing
policy platform.

4. Discussion
In this paper we have investigated information accountability and its application in healthcare.
We identified several key aspects of IA via related literature. We presented an IAF for eHRs
that would enable us to develop an accountability system for e-health. It is clear that IA is a
new concept to computer science and the proper definition of its principles is still in its
infancy. This is a significant barrier for systems developers to build systems that are IA
compliant. We believe that it is suitable to define or rather formulate the foundations for
accountability systems contextually. This would enable the system developers to gain a clearer
insight of the requirements of the system.
Privacy policy representation is a significant part of accountability systems. The arrangement
of policies varies depending on the nature of the information being protected and the nature of
the industry. For example, it is unclear as to who the actual owners of health information are.
This led us to introduce a policy aggregator engine to our IAF to amalgamate privacy policies
of the patients and the policies of a health authority. In a realistic scenario patients would be
given control of their eHR at a suitable age put forward by a relevant authority.
Being policy driven, the proper representation of the necessary policies is essential in
accountability systems. As a first step towards implementing the proposed IAF, we used the
open digital rights language for representing the various policies in the system. ODRL v2.0 is
a work in progress release which gave us the flexibility to accommodate certain requirements
of the healthcare domain. In order to implement the IAF a comprehensive set of attribute
values need to be defined. We have presented a simple scenario to demonstrate the policy
representations. Due to space restrictions we are unable to present a complete set of policy
representations in this paper.
A policy reasoning capability should be facilitated by an accountability system. This allows
the users (e.g. patients) to investigate possible breaches of policy and the accused (e.g. health
professionals) to defend their actions. But not all actions should be subject to such
investigation which would disrupt activities of care givers. The system being policy-aware
would identify possible breaches of policy and inform the relevant party giving them the
opportunity to take action.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
Accountability systems aim at keeping information safe from unnecessary disclosure and
misuse by making bad acts visible to all concerned and deter users from misusing information
by holding them accountable for misuse. Making this a reality is no easy feat. It involves the
collaboration of experts from several disciplines including social science, law, computer
science, and specialists form the domain for which the system is developed. The IAF presented
in this paper follows IA principles in the healthcare context. We have explored a means of
representing privacy policies in a machine readable manner which we intend to extend for
policy reasoning, policy-aware audit logs and ultimately for determining policy compliance of

information users. There is considerable amount of work to be done to make the IAF a
comprehensive tool for the implementation of accountability systems. We are currently
working on the implementation of this IAF to demonstrate its functionality in a simulated
healthcare environment. We are working to extend the ODRL model to support policy
reasoning to fulfill the requirements for accountability systems.
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